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Abstract
In this paper we examine the empirical relationship between price discrimination and competition in
television advertising. While most empirical papers on the topic document a positive relationship,
we nd that price discrimination is negatively related to competition (as measured by the number
of competing rms), a result that is consistent with conventional wisdom. Our results also show
that only incumbent stations (unlike entrants) respond by engaging less in price discrimination
when faced with a more competitive environment. Our evidence suggests that incumbents may use
price discrimination as a strategic tool to accommodate entry a strategy that has received scant
attention in the existing entry literature.
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1 Introduction
Price discrimination occurs whenever there is variation in prices across market segments that can-
not be fully explained by di¤erences in marginal costs (Verboven, 2008). Textbook economic theory
postulates three necessary conditions for price discrimination to occur: rms must be able to pre-
vent arbitrage, must be able to separate consumers into di¤erent groups, and must have market
power. Amongst these three conditions, market power has usually received much of the atten-
tion, manifested in the emergence of a vast literature studying competition as a source of price
discrimination (see Stole, 2007; and Verboven, 2008, for surveys).1
Since market power is necessary for price discrimination, conventional wisdom dictates that a
reduction in market power (brought about by an increase in competition) would entail less price
discrimination. However, that some market power is a necessary condition merely implies that
having no market power makes price discrimination impossible  indeed, with no market power,
prices in each market segment would equal marginal costs, and all di¤erences in prices would be
fully explained by variation in those marginal costs. On the other hand, it is easy to build examples
in which competition (due, e.g., to the entry of new rms) reduces market power in every segment,
but does more so in some segment, implying increased price dispersion in spite of reduced market
power (see, e.g., Chandra and Lederman, 2015).
It comes as no surprise then that [t]he extent of price discrimination has often been found
to increase as competition intensies, in contrast to conventional wisdom but consistent with new
theoretical insights(Verboven, 2008: 623). It is now well known from the works of, e.g., Borenstein
(1985), Holmes (1989), and Stole (1995), that price discrimination need not be smaller or less
prevalent in more competitive markets. As Holmes (1989) shows, prices in each market segment
1For a recent study of price discrimination that focuses on arbitrage possibilities, see Boik (2016).
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depend on the industry-demand elasticity (which measures how likely consumers are to stop buying
when price goes up) and the cross-price elasticity (which measures how likely they are to go to
another rm). For instance, brand loyalty among high-willingness-to-pay customers would work in
favor of increased price dispersion, and hence more price discrimination (Rochet and Stole, 2002).
Competition may also a¤ect a rms decision whether to discriminate at all i.e., the extensive
margin. For instance, if price discrimination entails xed costs, increased competition would reduce
the protability of discrimination if each demand segment becomes too small with respect to those
xed costs (Borzekowski, Thomadsen, and Taragin, 2009). Competition can also increase the
prevalence of price discrimination, for example, if it leads rms with small market shares to poach
rivalscustomers (due to switching costs, as in Taylor, 2003; or to a revealed preference for rivals
products, as in Villas-Boas, 1999); or if rms di¤er in their attractiveness to consumers (Dogan,
Haruvy, and Rao, 2010).
The empirical literature reports instances of both positive and negative e¤ects of competition on
the prevalence and intensity of price discrimination. On the one hand, evidence of a positive e¤ect
of competition on the intensity of price discrimination appears in Borenstein (1991) in the retail
gasoline market; Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Stavins (2001) in the US airline industry; Verboven
(1999) in the automobile industry; Nevo and Wolfram (2002) in ready-to-eat breakfast cereals; and
Seim and Viard (2011) in cellular services. On the other hand, some studies nd a negative e¤ect
of competition on the intensive margin of price discrimination; for instance, Busse and Rysman
(2005) in Yellow Pages ads; Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) in airlines; Becerra, Santalo, and Silva
(2011) in hotels; and Lin and Wang (2015) in parking lots. Notice that these are all industries in
which price discrimination is widespread. The issue of the propensity to price-discriminate (the
extensive margin) is addressed by Borzekowski, Thomadsen, and Taragin (2009) for mailing lists,
and Asplund, Eriksson, and Strand (2008) for newspapers. Both papers nd a positive e¤ect of
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competition on the use of price discrimination.
The recent literature, both theoretical and empirical, strongly suggests an ambiguous link be-
tween competition and price discrimination, which invites an empirical approach to the question. In
this paper we thus examine the empirical relationship between the propensity to price-discriminate
and competition, focusing on television advertising, for which we are not aware of any existing
evidence. We use a data set composed of three annual censuses of Spanish local television stations
published in the years 1996, 1999, and 2002. This collection of censuses provides information on
the number of local TV stations located in every town in Spain in each of the years 1995, 1998, and
2001, as well as station-specic data for a sample of all stations. The station-specic data include
information on whether the station broadcasts its content, whether it sells advertising, and whether
it price-discriminates. The Spanish local TV industry is well suited for the empirical exercise at
hand, since local markets vary quite a lot in the number of stations. In addition, the product
we focus on, a 20-second advertising spot in prime time, is easily comparable across stations and
markets.
We nd that price discrimination is negatively related to the degree of product-market com-
petition (as measured by the number of competing rms), a result that has generally not been
found in empirical papers on the topic, especially those looking at the extensive margin of price
discrimination. According to our results, an additional competitor is associated with a reduction
of almost 2 percentage points in the propensity to price-discriminate (a substantial e¤ect when
compared to a sample mean of 9 percent). This result is robust to the inclusion of various xed
e¤ects and regional time trends, and to sample denition.
The inclusion of xed e¤ects deals with the most common sources of endogeneity. To further
address endogeneity concerns, we exploit regulation-induced shocks to entry barriers and di¤erences
in regulation enforcement across regions to obtain a source of exogenous variation in the number
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of rival rms in the product market. We pursue two di¤erent identication strategies to pin down
the causal e¤ect of interest, both making use of political variables as instruments (Bertrand and
Kramarz, 2002). Specically, we instrument our competition variable and a measure of entry
barriers with the local share of votes of the more pro-entry political parties. Our nding of a
negative e¤ect of competition on price discrimination is robust to these alternative estimation
strategies.
Consistent with other papers reporting a negative e¤ect of competition on price discrimination,
we nd evidence that average prices decrease with competition. Finally, we show somewhat di¤erent
pricing behavior among incumbents and entrants: only incumbent stations respond by engaging less
in price discrimination when faced with a more competitive environment. We also suggest that the
evidence is consistent with price discrimination being used as a strategic variable to accommodate
entry a variable that has received scant attention in the existing literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on
the Spanish local TV industry between 1995 and 2002, and presents our data and methodology.
In Section 3 we show and discuss our ndings. Finally, Section 4 discusses the implications of our
ndings and concludes.
2 The Spanish Local Television Industry
2.1 Institutional details
The history of local television in Spain in the period considered in this paper can be divided
in three phases: (i) no regulation (1980-94), (ii) regulation by law (1994-95), and (iii) de facto
deregulation (1996-2002) (Badillo, 2005). Until the mid-1980s, Spain had just two TV stations,
TVE and TVE2. The former was the main station and the latter served as a window to minority
4
content and local news broadcast from small satellite stations that had little independence in their
programming decisions. The new democratic regime in Spain consolidated during the mid-1980s
and, as a consequence, the central government granted its regional counterparts the right to develop
regional stations. Still, the law did not recognize local TV stations as legal entities which did not
prevent a number of local stations from emerging in the late 1980s as a result of the joint e¤orts of
local civil associations.
The growth in the number and importance of local stations during those initial years exacer-
bated the need for a legal framework that would regulate their activities. As a result of di¤erent
lobbying pressures, the government of the (left-winged) Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)
approved the law of local TV stations in December 1995 (Law 41/1995, BOE 309, 27-12-1995),
to be implemented in 1996 e¤ectively ending the no-regulation period. This law aimed at regu-
lating the composition, commercial activities, ownership and competitive structure of the Spanish
local TV station sector. In particular, the 1995 law limited the number of stations to two per city
(regardless of population), banned TV networks, and restricted local TV stationsownership and
control to local governments and nonprot organizations. Within the limits of the law, spectrum
would be assigned just at the request of regional authorities (comunidades autónomas). Given
the nature of the 1995 law and the discussions surrounding its passing, one can safely assume the
new regulation was unrelated to pricing decisions indeed, neither the law nor any of the proposals
that circulated contained any disposition concerning price discrimination.
The PSOE model for the local television industry would be progressively dismantled in the
following years, as the right-winged Partido Popular (PP) rose to power. In March of 1996, the
PSOE unexpectedly lost the national election to the PP, which had a very di¤erent perspective
on how the local TV market should be regulated, if at all a perspective shared by the Coalición
Canaria (CC), a smaller, center-right party. Shortly after winning the election, the PP (which had
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no majority in Congress) unsuccessfully tried to pass a new law that would lift the restrictions on
number of stations and private ownership and management introduced by the 1995 law. Rather
than insisting on a new law, the PP government took the alternative route of not implementing
the PSOE law what Badillo (2005) has termed an invisible deregulation.Meanwhile, several
regional governments decided to pass complementary regulations reecting their di¤erent views on
how the industry should be regulated but without much success.
We see evidence of a lack of enforcement of the PSOE law in the relatively low levels of sanction-
ing activity by the PP administration. According to data from the Asociación de Investigación de
Medios de Comunicación (AIMC hereafter) which most likely underestimates true entry because
AIMC only records the date of entry of those stations that respond to its census 508 stations were
created between 1995 and 2002, all of which were, stricto sensu, illegal. The level of sanctioning
by the authorities in that period did not match this level of entry: only 115 new les were opened
between 1997 and 2002 (with a signicant decrease toward the end of the period; see Badillo, 2003,
for details). Badillo (2003, 2005a,b, 2011) and Bustamante (2002) provide abundant anecdotal
evidence on this di¤erential enforcement of the PSOE law.2
The 2000 election speeded up the (de facto) deregulation of local TV stations, because the PP
gained full control of Congress and decided to push forward the (de jure) deregulation that the
previous legislature had stopped. The PP took to Congress a revision of the law approved in 1995,
which allowed the number of stations to be proportional to the number of inhabitants per city, no
longer required local stations to be government owned or managed, allowed stations to be for-prot
organizations, and lifted the ban on network formation. The new law was only passed in December
2Coming by more systematic evidence is di¢ cult because information on les opened and sanctions is only
available from 1997, and even for this period, public records do not contain information on sanctions at the station
or region level.
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of 2002 (Law 53/2002, BOE 313, 12-31-2002), but its main dispositions had been progressively
implemented (and a¤ected stationsentry decisions) since the PP took o¢ ce. We observe further
evidence of this de facto deregulation in the emergence of vertical networks such as Localia and
Vocento already in 2001 and 2002, even though the 1995 law clearly prevented stations from being
part of any network (horizontal or vertical). The complete undoing of the PSOE model of Law
41/1995 was achieved in 2004 with the digitization plan for local television approved by the PP
government.
2.2 Data and Methodology
The main data set used in this paper is composed by the Spanish censuses of local TV stations
collected in 1995, 1998, and 2001 by the Asociación de Investigación de Medios de Comunicación
(AIMC) and published in 1996, 1999, and 2002. These censuses collected information on the names
and number of local TV stations per city and province for the years 1995, 1998, and 2001.3 Ac-
cording to the data, 881 stations were operating in 1995, 740 stations in 1998, and 898 in 2001.
To create these censuses, the AIMC sent questionnaires to each of the existing stations in each
year and published the responses.4 183 stations responded in 1995, whereas 457 and 645 responded
in 1998 and 2001.5 In the questionnaire, station managers answered questions regarding the sta-
tion operations, coverage area, weekly and daily schedules, association memberships, advertising,
3AIMC data do not include stations with sporadic and random emission of television content but rather established
entities that transmit on a regular basis.
4The questionnaires were sent by mail to every station. After some time, non-responding stations were contacted
by telephone.
5The low response rate in 1995 raises the concern of potential nonrandom sample selection. Although not shown
here, we have regressed a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a station answers the questionnaire on a set of city
characteristics (including electoral results), and found no statistically signicant relationship between these variables
suggesting that sample selection is unlikely to be a¤ecting our results. These results are available upon request.
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subscription fees, and broadcasting.6
The AIMC questionnaire also asked managers about the price of a 20-second advertising spot
in prime time (Advertising prices).7 For the purposes of this paper, we use the fact that stations
sometimes report a range of prices, with price depending on certain characteristics of the customer
(such as whether it is a private or government organization) or on quantity (e.g., on the number
of advertising spots bought). Price discounts reported in the questionnaire range between 25 and
50 percent in the advertising market, and between 10 and 25 percent in the content market. Very
few stations price-discriminate on the content side of the market (3 stations, 6 observations); some
in low-competition markets, some in high-competition markets. With so few observations, it is
hard to know whether this is systematic or mere coincidence.8 We thus focus in this study on
price discrimination in advertising space, and use as the main dependent variable in this study a
dummy variable (Price discrimination) that takes value 1 if a station sells advertising and price-
discriminates, and 0 if the station sells advertising and reports to set a uniform price.
With this denition of Price discrimination, we do not distinguish between second- and third-
degree price discrimination in our empirical exercises. The wording of the AIMC questionnaire,
asking for the price (in singular) of a 20-second ad, could induce measurement error in our
dependent variable if some stations o¤ering multiple prices simply reported an average price, a
list price or the most commonly charged price (causing us to classify the observation alongside
6The original questionnaire can be found in the Appendix.
7Advertising in local television has been growing markedly from less than 5 million euros in 1995
to almost 40 million in 2001, according to Infoadex, the largest database on advertising in Spain
(http://www.infoadex.es/estudios.html). At the beginning of our sample period, advertisers where mostly local,
but the industry was soon able to attract regional advertisers and, more recently, large national and international
advertisers (like Procter & Gamble and Unilever).
8Additionally, since some observations correspond to the same stations in di¤erent years, using them would imply
inated signicance.
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non-discriminators when we should not). As long as this choice is not made strategically (say, to
obfuscate prices see Ellison and Ellison, 2009), this possibility implies that our results are best
interpreted as lower bounds on the true e¤ect of competition on price discrimination.
As in Busse and Rysman (2005) and Lin andWang (2015), the industry we study is characterized
by the fact that di¤erences in costs are negligible, and not a¤ected by the extent of competition.
Therefore, di¤erences in prices can be attributed to price discrimination. In some specications we
use Advertising prices as the dependent variable. If a station reports a range of prices, we use the
average of the highest and lowest prices reported.
To estimate the impact of product-market competition on the propensity to price-discriminate
in the Spanish local TV industry, we begin by running traditional ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions of the propensity to price-discriminate (Price discrimination) on the number of stations
located in a stations coverage area (No. stations), as reported in the AIMC censuses. We make
full use of the panel structure of our data to deal with several sources of unobserved heterogeneity
by including time, region, and station xed e¤ects, as discussed in Section 3.1.
Despite our e¤orts to address endogeneity through our use of the panel dimension of the dataset,
these results are best interpreted as conditional correlations. A traditional concern in this kind of
study is that rms in more protable markets could be more likely to price discriminate, and more
protable markets may induce more rm entry which would bias our estimates. While this is
not the case here, since we nd that stations in less competitive markets are also more likely to
price discriminate, some concerns still remain. Our use of the number of stations located in a
stations coverage area as our competition measure might induce some measurement error in our
main explanatory variable, because this measure misses stations that broadcast to the coverage area
but are not located in the area. Moreover, specic, unobservable, time-varying shocks to the local
television industry might a¤ect both price discrimination and the number of rms. For example,
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if markets with more variation in their preference for local content also allow for more market
segmentation, we are likely to observe stations in markets with more competition choosing very
di¤erent levels of price discrimination, and therefore nd no correlation between the propensity to
discriminate and competition across markets, because of the underlying variation in the demand
for local content.
To address these concerns, we exploit the institutional environment described in Section 2.1 to
pursue two di¤erent identication strategies to pin down the causal e¤ect of interest. In both, we
run IV regressions using political variables as instruments (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002). Given
that enforcement of the PSOE 1995 law depended strongly on the political party of the regional
authorities supposed to implement it, it seems likely that enforcement was lighter where the PP
and the CC captured a large share of votes. Therefore, we rst use the share of votes of the
PP and the CC (PP+CC share of votes) at the regional level in the previous national election to
instrument No. stations in each period.9 The source of the electoral data is the data set Consulta
de Resultados Electorales of the Subsecretaria de la Direccion General de Politica Interior at
Ministerio del Interior in the Spanish Governments website.10 We include the electoral outcomes
by region (comunidad autónoma) from the June 1993, March 1996, and March 2000 Spanish
national elections.
For our second IV strategy, we exploit the fact that the 1995 PSOE law raised entry barriers
in the local TV industry by limiting the number of stations to two per city. The stringency of
this restriction, in principle, depended on whether a given city had more than two stations in 1995
9To the extent that electoral outcomes measure peoples preferences, this could have a direct impact on rms
pricing strategies. To minimize this concern, we use the national elections instead of local elections because people
are more likely to vote according to their political values, and independently from the regulation of the local TV
industry itself, in the former (see Schivardi and Viviano, 2011).
10http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/.
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prior to the law. We implement a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach, and compare the change in
price discrimination in stations located in cities with more than two stations prior to the law to the
change in price discrimination in stations located elsewhere. We separate these cities by means of
a dummy variable, Over 2?, that takes a value of 1 if the city had more than two stations in 1995.
We also build a dummy Post law? that takes a value of 1 for 1998 and 2001 observations and 0
for 1995 observations. Since the number of rms in 1995 could be endogenous, we use the share of
votes of the PP and the CC at the regional level in the June 1993 national election (PP+CC 1993
share), i.e. more than two years before the law was passed, as an instrument and interact it with
the post-law dummy to implement our strategy.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables used in our empirical analysis. Information
in this table shows that 81 percent of the stations sell advertising space, but only 9 percent practice
some form of price discrimination. Although these numbers may seem low, they are not surprising
as local TV stations face the strongest competition of all television layers as they compete for
advertisers with local outlets such as radio stations, newspapers and magazines. The average
station faces 5:6 rivals in its coverage area and charges 11; 687 pesetas (about 70 euros) for a 20-
second advertising spot in prime time. Additionally, 80 percent of the stations responding to the
questionnaire are privately owned, roughly 60 percent of them belong to a network, and 80 percent
broadcast their content.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The last two variables in Table 1 are measured at the region and city levels, respectively. The
PP and Coalición Canaria (CC), the more pro-entry parties, received on average around 42 percent
of votes in national elections, but there is signicant variation across regions and elections. The
table also shows that 17 percent of cities had more than two stations in 1995, which would soon
put some of those stations in violation of the PSOE law of December 1995.
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The rightmost columns of Table 1 break the sample by year, to preview changes over time in
our variables of interest. For instance, the average number of stations in a stations coverage area
rst decreased and the increased from census to census, beginning with 5:5 in 1996, down to 4:7 in
1999, and reaching 6:2 in 2002. At the same time, the use of price discrimination declined along
the period from 12% in 1996 to 7% in 2002. Last, the percentage of votes of the PP and the CC
increased steadily, as discussed in Section 2.1.
3 Results
In this section we present and discuss the ndings of our empirical exploration. Our main interest is
on the e¤ect of competition on price discrimination, but we also examine the e¤ect of competition
on price levels and whether entrants and incumbents di¤er in their pricing responses to competition.
It is useful to begin our investigation by exploring the variation in our data. To inform about
the distribution of competition changes and grasp what changes are driving the e¤ect on price
discrimination, Table 2 tabulates changes in the number of stations and price discrimination deci-
sions by station and by year in our sample. The top panel in Table 2 groups stations by whether
they price discriminated (PD in the table and hereafter) in both 1996 and 1999, only 1996 or only
1999, or none of those years against changes in the number of competing stations. Note that those
stations that always PD were more likely to experience increases in competition than decreases in
competition, those stations that never PD were more likely to experience decreases in competition,
those that PD in 1999 only were more likely to experience a decrease in competition, and those
that only PD in 1996 were also more likely to experience a decrease in competition. Overall, a
third of the stations that we observe both in 1996 and 1999 (79 in total) did not experience a
change in the number of competing stations, slightly less than a third experienced an increase in
the number of competing stations, and slightly more than a third experienced a decrease in the
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number of competing stations.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The bottom panel in Table 2 groups stations by whether they PD and the change in the
number of competing stations between 1999 and 2002. Out of a total of 206 stations, 172 (roughly
83%) stations that never PD were also more likely to experience large increases in the number of
competing stations. Those stations that PD in 1999 and stopped in 2002 were also more likely to
experience an increase in competition. Those stations that always PD, or did not PD in 1999 and
PD in 2002, were equally likely to experience an increase or a decrease in the number of competing
stations. Therefore, it overall looks like the increase in competition that occurred as a result of
the invisible deregulation in the Spanish local TV industry was associated with a decrease in the
unconditional propensity to price discriminate. While this preliminary evidence is interesting, it is
important to further control for di¤erences in market and station characteristics, so we now turn
to these matters.
3.1 Competition and Price Discrimination
The empirical analysis in this paper aims to uncover the relationship between product-market
competition and price discrimination in the Spanish local TV industry. We start our empirical
investigation by producing traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of this relationship
in Table 3. Column (1) of this table contains a simple regression of price discrimination on our
competition measure (No. stations), and shows a small but statistically signicant negative e¤ect
of competition on the propensity to price discriminate.11 This result is robust to the inclusion of
11As discussed in Section 2, the 1995 PSOE law gave regional authorities leeway in granting TV licenses. Since
regions di¤ered in their views about market structure and entry, errors terms are likely to be correlated within a
given region. Therefore, we cluster standard errors at the regional level in every regression that we report. Clustering
standard errors at the city level would not a¤ect our results.
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covariates in column (2), where given the regulations of the 1995 lawwe control for ownership
type (public vs. private; Private? ) and network membership (Belongs to network? ). Private
stations show a stronger tendency towards price discrimination than their public counterparts, and
so do rms belonging to a network (although this last e¤ect is never statistically signicant).
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
In column (3) of Table 3 we add year xed e¤ects to the specication in column (2). These year
dummies account for aggregate time shocks, like policy changes at the national level that might
a¤ect the local TV industry. In particular, the year xed e¤ects will capture the di¤erent attitudes
towards industry regulation by the central government (the PSOE in 1995, the PP with no majority
in 1998, and the PP with a majority in 2001) and the pre- and post-law operating environments.
As can be seen from the table, the e¤ect of competition on price discrimination remains essentially
unchanged. The same is true in column (4), which exploits the within-region variability in price
discrimination to identify the e¤ect of interest, and thus controls for region-specic time-invariant
factors, like the regions traditional views towards local television.
Column (5) includes station xed e¤ects, and hence exploits within-station changes in price
discrimination decisions. When we look at the within-station variability, the e¤ect of competition
on price discrimination is still very signicant and becomes much larger in magnitude. According
to the results in column (5), an additional competitor is associated to a reduction of almost 2
percentage points in the propensity to price discriminate (a substantial e¤ect when compared to a
sample mean of 9 percent).
The number of competitors a station faces di¤ers systematically across regions, raising the
concern that price discrimination may have evolved di¤erentially over time across regions and that
our competition measure may in part be capturing such di¤erential trends. To address this concern,
we introduce region-specic time trends and therefore we allow the incidence of price discrimination
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to grow at a di¤erent average annual rate in each region in column (6). The estimated coe¢ cient
on No. stations is unchanged in this alternative specication.
In a nutshell, Table 3 shows a robust negative e¤ect of competition on price discrimination.
This result is consistent with conventional wisdom when competition erodes a rms market power
which is more likely, given an industry-demand elasticity, when goods are close substitutes (as is
admittedly the case with advertising spots on TV) and the cross-price elasticity is high. Previous
studies have reported similar results for other industries with low di¤erentiation such as Yellow
Pages ads (Busse and Rysman, 2005), low-quality hotels (Becerra, Santalo, and Silva, 2011), and
parking lots (Lin and Wang, 2015).
3.2 Robustness checks
To further explore the robustness of our results in Table 3, we run four additional checks in Table
4. Our sample includes many stations that we observe only once, and hence contribute nothing to
the within-station variability of price discrimination. In column (1) of Table 4 we have reproduced
the specication with station xed e¤ects of column (6) in Table 3, but we have limited our sample
to those stations that we observe at least twice. The coe¢ cient associated to No. stations is very
similar in both magnitude and statistical signicance.12
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The TV industry is typically considered to be two-sided, and price discrimination in these
settings is made not just with an eye on how much value a station might capture from customers
on one side of the market, but also on how it changes what the station might then capture from
customers on the other side (see, e.g., Liu and Serfes, 2013; Rysman, 2009; and Weyl, 2010). Even
though only three stations report to simultaneously price-discriminate on both sides of the market,
12The same result obtains if we only consider the 63 stations that always respond to the questionnaire.
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there might still remain some concern that omitting the cross-groups external e¤ect between viewers
and advertisers could lead to biased estimates. We minimize this concern by excluding these three
stations (6 observations in total) in column (2), and by restricting the analysis in column (3)
to stations that broadcast their content  stations that could be regarded as having made an
irrevocable commitment not to price-discriminate on the content side (as broadcasters they are,
indeed, charging a uniform price of zero). The negative e¤ect of competition still shows up in
these specications and is statistically signicant and similar in magnitude to the e¤ects previously
found.
Finally, we estimate a logit model with our same binary dependent variable as an alternative to
all the specications in Table 3. We show in column (4) of Table 4 that our main result is robust
and we nd a signicant negative e¤ect of competition on price discrimination when using a logit
specication.13
3.3 Addressing endogeneity further
To further address the endogeneity concerns discussed in Section 2.2, we look for sources of ex-
ogenous variation in competitive conditions in the changes in the regulatory environment of local
television. We begin by instrumenting No. stations with the share of votes of the PP and the CC
(PP+CC share of votes) at the regional level in the previous national election.14 Column (A) in
13While we have run all the models in Table 3 as logit models and qualitatively found similar results, for the sake
of brevity we only report the results from the most complete specication in Table 4. All unreported results are
available upon request.
14Local TV stations also compete for advertisers with other outlets such as radio, newspapers, and national and
regional TV stations. A concern here is that TV stations might be more likely to enter a market with less competition
from other outlets, and that those markets might at the same time provide more opportunity for price discrimination.
Given that the changes in the regulatory environment that we use as instruments only concerned local TV stations,
our IV strategy should deal with this problem.
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Table 5 shows a robust rst stage, with a positive e¤ect of PP+CC share of votes on the number of
stations, as expected. In particular, a 10-percentage point increase in the vote share of the PP and
the CC results in almost two additional rivals. Column (1) presents the second-stage estimates, and
shows a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect of competition on price discrimination, lending
further support to our OLS results.15
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Next, we implement a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach, comparing the change in price dis-
crimination in stations located in cities with more than two stations prior to the law to the change
in price discrimination in stations located elsewhere, using the share of votes of the PP and the CC
at the regional level in the June 1993 national election (interacted with Post law? ) to instrument
Over2?*Post law?.16 Consistent with our expectations, column (B) shows a positive e¤ect of the
share of votes of the PP and the CC on the probability of observing more than two stations in a
given city prior to the law. In column (2) we show the second stage. The causal e¤ect of interest is
the coe¢ cient on the interaction Over2?*Post law?. We nd a positive and statistically signicant
coe¢ cient, which we ascribe to a negative e¤ect of competition on price discrimination; indeed,
price discrimination increases more in stations located in cities where the PSOE law should have
restricted competition the most.17
15The opportunity cost of a 20-second ad would be the same across all stations at a given time, but not necessarily
across di¤erent days or weeks or time of the day. This could result in intertemporal price discrimination. The IV
strategy should rule this out as an explanation.
16To save space, we have not reported the results of the di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach without the instrumental
variable (which are available upon request). The estimated coe¢ cient is less than one hundredth of the one reported
in Table 5, and largely nonsignicant (p-value of :897).
17Note that the specications in Table 5 do not use station xed e¤ects. Since stations do not change location,
those stations located in towns with more than two stations are likely to lack variation in the Over 2? dummy.
Similarly, our instrument, PP+CC 1993 share of votes does not vary over time. Therefore, because we mainly rely
17
3.4 Competition and Prices
So far we have documented a negative relationship between price discrimination and competition.
However, this nding does not reveal much about the level of prices. A basic insight in economics is
that competition will reduce prices. Even if competition reduces some prices more than others (and
may lead to increased price dispersion), as long as it reduces all prices it will reduce the average
price.18 For example, Busse and Rysman (2005) and Becerra, Santalo, and Silva (2011), mentioned
earlier in our discussion of the price discrimination literature, nd that competition actually reduces
all prices.
On the other hand, instances of price-increasing competition (Chen and Riordan, 2008) have
been reported in Perlo¤, Suslow, and Seguin (2005) in the anti-ulcer drug market; Ward et al.
(2002) in the food industry; and Thomadsen (2007) in fast food. An explanation is provided in
Rosenthal (1980): if we assume each station faces a loyal group of advertisers and a group willing
to switch station; with an increased number of stations competing for the switching group, each
individual station would be tempted to exploit the loyal advertisers through a higher (uniform)
price. Another potential explanation comes from agglomeration theory: if entry of new stations
makes watching television more attractive to potential viewers, stations could also face increased
demand for advertising space that is likely to manifest itself through the ability to charge higher
prices (McCann and Vroom, 2010).19
on variation across stations, and not within stations over time, we cannot introduce station xed e¤ects in Table 5.
18Even if prices increase in some markets and decrease in others, Holmes (1989) argues that there is a sense in
which reduced price discrimination reduces the averageprice, because the reduction in price in the strong market
compared to the uniform price is large relative to the increase in the weak-market price.
19Entry of new stations could also provide demand-related legitimation to the local TV industry another demand-
side externality that would strengthen the tendency to increase prices in response to enhanced competition. For further
discussion and references, check McCann and Vroom (2010).
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Table 6 presents evidence of a negative e¤ect of competition on prices in the Spanish local TV
industry, consistent with conventional economic theory and previous empirical ndings. In Table
6, we re-run the specications in column (6) of Table 3 (column [1] in Table 6) and both of our IV
strategies in Table 5 (columns [2] and [3] in Table 6) replacing Price discrimination with Advertising
prices as the dependent variable.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
We nd a statistically signicant reduction in advertising prices in response to a larger number
of competing rms in columns (2) and (3). The inclusion of station xed e¤ects leaves almost
no variation to be explained by our competition variable (R-squared of 93 percent) in the OLS
regression, which becomes statistically not di¤erent from zero in the specication in column (1).
3.5 Pricing Behavior of Incumbents and Entrants
To further analyze the pricing behavior of rms in this industry, we separate entrants from in-
cumbents.20 We classify an observation as belonging to an entrant if the station entered within
the three years prior to the census to which the observation belongs. Otherwise, we regard the
observation as corresponding to an incumbent. It might be argued that a station that has been
broadcasting for almost three years is hardly an entrant. We o¤er two lines of defense here. First,
since we only observe the behavior of incumbent rms every three years, their pricing decisions in
a given census year will at least partly be picking up the incumbents response to all entry that
has occurred in the three-year period between censuses. Second, more stringent denitions of an
entrant would reduce the number of entrant observations and work against nding a signicant
20Summary statistics of incumbents and entrants in our sample are available upon request. If anything, incumbents
are less likely to sell advertising spots, to broadcast their content and to be located in a city with more than two
stations, are more likely to belong to a network, they face a lower number of competing stations in their coverage
area, and are located in regions with lower vote shares of PP+CC.
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response to competition in entrantspricing choices, because of reduced power.21
Table 7 shows results from regressions of our price discrimination dummy on competition,
including controls, year xed and region xed e¤ects, as well as region-specic time trends.22
Columns (1) to (3) show that incumbent stations engage less in price discrimination when facing
a larger number of competitors.23 The e¤ects are statistically signicant (except in column [3],
where it is marginally nonsignicant) and similar in magnitude to those found in Tables 3 and 5.
Entrants, on the other hand, show no statistically or economically signicant e¤ect of competition
on price discrimination, as displayed in columns (4) to (6), where all the coe¢ cients are much
smaller than for incumbents.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Since the regressions in Table 7 exploit the within-region variability in price discrimination, the
reaction of incumbent stations to competition need not be due to actual entry of new rms. Re-
running the specication in column (1) with station xed e¤ects (not reported) shows a negative
e¤ect of competition on the propensity to price-discriminate by incumbents, which is similar in
magnitude to the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 although the e¤ect is imprecisely estimated. This
(admittedly weak) evidence suggests that price discrimination is used by incumbents as a strategic
variable to accommodate entry  a variable that has received scant attention in the literature,
which has focused more on dimensions such as advertising, patenting, brand proliferation, exclusive
dealing, price cuts, and diversication, among others.24
21Nevertheless, we tried dening an entrant as a rm that has been on air less than two years, and less than one
year, and our results (available upon request) are qualitatively unchanged.
22Since a station is an entrant only once, we cannot run entrant regressions with station xed e¤ects. To provide
a level playing eld for the comparison, we have also run the incumbent regressions with region xed e¤ects.
23First stages have been omitted to avoid cluttering and are available upon request.
24See, for instance, Anand and Girotra (2007), Bunch and Smiley (1992), Kadiyali (1996), Kalra et al. (1998),
Koski and Majumdra (2002), Robinson (1988), and Wright (2008).
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To sketch out the argument for uniform pricing as an entry-accommodation strategy, consider
two rms (an incumbent I and an entrant E) selling di¤erentiated goods to di¤erent market seg-
ments or consumer groups. If rms have di¤erent rankings of consumer groups by their demand
elasticities at a given rivals price (what Corts, 1998, termed best-response asymmetry), then
price discrimination makes rms tough (or aggressive) when setting prices in the product market,
and the strategic complementarity in price-discrimination decisions leads to all-out competition
(Corts, 1998) and lower prots for both. Assume now that, prior to rm Es entry decision (and
the ensuing simultaneous price setting), rm I can make a (credible) commitment not to price
discriminate in the price-setting stage. By committing to uniform prices, rm I e¤ectively commits
to being soft and accommodates entry by avoiding an aggressive response from rm E a puppy
dogstrategy (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984) that provides a rationalization of the results in Table
7.
4 Conclusions
The recent literature on price discrimination under imperfect competition stresses that the link
between competition and price discrimination is ambiguous  suggesting an empirical approach
to the question. In this paper, we have empirically examined the impact of competition on the
propensity to price-discriminate in the context of television advertising, using the Spanish local
TV industry as our laboratory. Contrary to most previous ndings in the literature, but consistent
with conventional wisdom, we document a negative causal e¤ect of competition on the use price
discrimination. We have also found that competition decreases average prices.
Our results also suggest that price discrimination is yet another strategic dimension that should
be considered when analyzing incumbent rms responses to entry: incumbent stations in our
sample react to the entry of new stations by reducing price discrimination. Delving deeper into
21
these strategic considerations is an interesting avenue for future research.
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CENSO DE TELEVISIONES LOCALES 
1. Nombre de la emisora: _______________________________________________________
2. Dirección (Calle, Número, Municipio, Código Postal,  Provincia): ____________________
__________________________________________________________________________
3. Año de comienzo de las emisiones: _____________________________________________
4. Nombre del director/a: _______________________________________________________
5. Teléfono1: _________________________ Teléfono2:_______________________ 
6. Fax: ______________________________
7. E-mail: ____________________________
8. Disponen de página Web  Sí / No
En caso afirmativo, indique la dirección completa: _________________________________
9. Asociaciones/Redes a las que pertenece: _________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
10. Propiedad de la cadena (Privada, Municipal, Mixta, Etc.):___________________________
11. Días de emisión: _____________________________________________
12. Horario de emisión: ___________________________________________
13. Área de cobertura: __________________________________________________________
14. Sistema de difusión (Terrestre, Cable, MMDS): _____________________________
En caso de difusión por cable, Importe cuota mensual: _________________________ 
Nombre del servicio o red de cable: ________________ 
En caso de difusión terrestre, Potencia de salida en Watios: _____________________ 
Canal Radioeléctrico: ___________________________ 
15. Emiten publicidad  Sí / No
En caso afirmativo, precio de un spot de 20 segundos en prime-time: __________________
16. Porcentaje que la producción propia supone sobre el total de tiempo de emisión (cifra aproximada):
___________________________________________
17. Observaciones:_____________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
Por último, agradeceríamos nos informase de otras televisiones locales que están funcionando en el 
mismo ámbito geográfico que la suya o en las zonas adyacentes: ________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
CENSO DE TELEVISIONES LOCALES - OCTUBRE 2002
NOTAS METODOLÓGICAS
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Appendix: Station Questionnaire
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 1996 1999 2002
Discriminates Prices? 1,020 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.12 0.10 0.07
(0.32) (0.30) (0.26)
Sells advertising spots? 1,261 0.81 0.39 0 1 0.89 0.77 0.82
(0.31) (0.42) (0.39)
Advertising prices 791 11,687 17,288 0 130,000 11,719 11,946 11,487
(18,899) (17,800) (16,383)
No. stations in coverage area 1,291 5.56 7.73 1 69 5.46 4.67 6.23
(6.40) (6.68) (8.65)
Private? 1,255 0.80 0.40 0 1 0.80 0.79 0.80
(0.40) (0.41) (0.40)
Belongs to network? 1,291 0.58 0.49 0 1 0.67 0.52 0.60
(0.47) (0.50) (0.49)
Broadcasts? 1,267 0.80 0.40 0 1 0.83 0.76 0.82
(0.38) (0.43) (0.38)
PP+CC share of votes 1,287 41.97 12.87 14.68 71.37 34.84 39.23 45.91
(12.38) (12.51) (11.87)
More than two stations in city in 1995? 1,291 0.17 0.38 0 1
Note: Advertising prices are measured in pesetas (1 Euro = 166 pesetas). When summary statistics are broken up by year, mean (above) and 
standard deviation (below in parentheses) are reported.
Table 2. Changes in the Number of Competing Stations & Price Discrimination Across Years
1996‐1999
Change in No Stations
‐3 or Less ‐2 ‐1 0 +1 +2 +3 or More Total
Always PD 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 6
Never PD 13 4 8 20 7 2 10 64
PD in 1999 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 4
PD in 1996 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 5
Total 14 5 10 25 8 3 13 79
1999‐2002
Change in No Stations
‐3 or Less ‐2 ‐1 0 +1 +2 +3 or More Total
Always PD 1 0 1 5 3 0 4 14
Never PD 3 5 14 67 21 18 44 172
PD in 1999 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 8
PD in 2002 1 0 1 8 1 0 1 12
Total 6 5 17 81 26 18 53 206
Note: This table tabulates the change in the number of  competing TV stations in the 1996‐1999 and 1999‐2002 
three‐year periods against whether the focal TV station price discriminated advertisers in both, one or none 
of the two observations.
Table 3. Competition and Price Discrimination ‐ Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var: Price discrimination
No. stations -0.0021** -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0021*** -0.0184*** -0.0185***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0059) (0.0061)
Private? 0.0742*** 0.0739*** 0.0623*** 0.1105 0.0810
(0.0200) (0.0186) (0.0210) (0.1448) (0.1801)
Belongs to network? 0.0081 0.0082 0.0113 0.0721 0.0937
(0.0164) (0.0181) (0.0175) (0.0611) (0.0776)
Constant 0.1003*** 0.0352* 0.0345* 0.0715 0.0550 0.0240
(0.0088) (0.0171) (0.0165) (0.0422) (0.1504) (0.1948)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes No No
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Regional time trends No No No No No Yes
Observations 1,020 994 994 994 994 994
R‐squared 0.0036 0.0123 0.0164 0.0329 0.8035 0.8314
Notes: All models are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors clustered at the region level are in parentheses. 
Price discrimination  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station reports any sort of price discrimination 
when selling a 20‐second spot in prime time. No. stations is the numbers of TV stations located in a station's  
coverage area. Private?  Is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station is privately owned. Belongs to network?
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station belongs to a (horizontal) local TV station network. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4. Competition and Price Discrimination ‐ Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Var: Price discrimination
No. stations -0.0185*** -0.0188*** -0.0130** -0.6520**
(0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.3017)
Private? 0.1373 0.0837 0.0910
(0.1626) (0.1751) (0.2326)
Belongs to network? 0.0930 0.0971 0.0838 2.6273
(0.0599) (0.0808) (0.0994) (2.8995)
Constant -0.0289 0.0437 -0.0293 -13.5293***
(0.1742) (0.2000) (0.2114) (1.5613)
Sample
All stations 
with 2+ 
observations
Only stations 
that never 
discriminate on 
the content side 
of the market
Broadcasting 
stations All stations
Model Linear probability
Linear 
probability
Linear 
probability Logit
Observations 575 988 823 46
R‐squared 0.7723 0.8381 0.8668 0.4346
Notes: Models (1) to (3) are estimated by OLS. Model (4) is estimated by ML. Robust
standard errors clustered at the region level are in parentheses. All regressions include 
year and station fixed effects, as well as regional time trends. Price discrimination is a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station reports any sort of price discrimination 
when selling a 20‐second spot in prime time. No. stations  is the numbers of TV stations 
located in a station's coverage area. Private? is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
station is privately owned. Belongs to network? is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if
the station belongs to a (horizontal) local TV station network. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5. Competition and Price Discrimination ‐ IV Results
(A) (1) (B) (2)
Dep Var: No. stations
Price 
discrimination
No. stations Price 
discrimination
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
No. stations -1.8025***
(0.3635)
Over 2? * Post law? 0.7164**
(03475)
Over 2? 0.7696*** -0.5809*
(0.0170) (0.2982)
Post law? 0.5610*** -1.1127***
(0.0125) (0.2185)
PP+CC share of votes 0.1964***
(0.0417)
PP+CC 1993 share * Post law? 0.0023***
(0.0005)
Private? 3.5142** 6.3918*** 0.0162 0.0443***
(1.2952) (1.1657) (0.0109) (0.0164)
Belongs to network? -1.008 -1.7975 -0.0071 0.0190
(1.0065) (1.4518) (0.0070) (0.0166)
Constant -1.7712 8.1996*** -0.5500*** 1.0794***
(1.5500) (2.0321) (0.0160) (0.2084)
Observations 992 992 994 994
R‐squared 0.4759 0.8728
F of excluded instruments 22.11 21.24
Notes: All models are estimated by 2SLS and include year and region fixed effects, as well as
regional time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the region level are in parentheses. 
Price discrimination  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station reports any sort of price
discrimination when selling a 20‐second spot in prime time. No. stations is the numbers of TV 
stations located in a station's coverage area. Private? is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
station is privately owned. Belongs to network? is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station 
belongs to a (horizontal) local TV station network. Over 2? is dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the city where the station is located had more than two stations in 1995. Post law?  is a dummy that
takes value 1 for 1998 and 2001 observations. PP+CC share of votes  is the share of votes of the PP
and the CC at the regional level in the previous national election. PP+CC 1993 share  is the share of
votes of the PP and the CC at the regional level in the June 1993 national election. Columns (A) and
(B) are first‐stage regressions of (1) and (2) respectively.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6. Competition and Prices
(1) (2) (3)
Dep Var: Advertising prices
No. stations -216.37 -1,091.56***
(202.72) (58.06)
Over 2? * Post law? 28,254.68*
(16,657.60)
Over 2? -16,960.20
(14,231.49)
Post law? -5,986.89***
(872.24)
Private? 4,284.53 8,568.03*** 3,932.35***
(8,516.97) (1,481.67) (1,276.64)
Belongs to network? 155.67 -3,505.78* -2,522.88**
(2,470.17) (1,964.63) (1,145.46)
Constant 7,644.81 21,496.72*** 12,216.81***
(7,949.94) (2,328.85) (2,078.42)
Fixed effects Station Region Region
Observations 775 773 775
F of excluded instruments 1164.80 20.88
Notes: Model (1) is estimated by OLS. Models (2) and (3) are estimated by 2SLS.
Robust standard errors clustered at the region level are in parentheses. All 
regressions include year and region fixed effects, as well as regional time trends. 
Advertising prices  is the price of a 20‐second spot in prime time, measured in
pesetas (1 Euro = 166 pesetas). No. stations is the numbers of TV stations located 
in a station's coverage area, and is instrumented with PP+CC share of votes ,
the share of votes of the PP and the CC at the regional level in the previous 
national election. Private?  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station is 
privately owned. Belongs to network? is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if
the station belongs to a (horizontal) local TV station network. Over 2?  is dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the city where the station is located had more than
two stations in 1995. Post law?  is a dummy that takes value 1 for 1998 and 2001 
observations. The interaction Over 2? * Post law?  is instrumented with the 
interaction PP+CC 1993 share * Post law? , where PP+CC 1993 share is the share
of votes of the PP and the CC at the regional level in the June 1993 national 
election.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7. Behavior of Incumbents and Entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var: Price discrimination
No. stations -0.0039*** -0.0430*** 0.0016 0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0063) (0.0018) (0.0034)
Over 2? * Post law? 1.145 0.2779
(0.7736) (0.1873)
Over 2? -0.9869 -0.2177
(0.7343) (0.1402)
Post law? 0.0775*** -0.0621
(0.0222) (0.0689)
Private? 0.0709** 0.1675*** 0.0497** 0.0598* 0.0385 0.0392**
(0.0283) (0.0500) (0.0247) (0.0294) (0.0384) (0.0189)
Belongs to Network? 0.0296 0.0238 0.0315 0.0302 0.0335 0.0372
(0.0228) (0.0327) (0.0271) (0.0388) (0.0400) (0.0413)
Constant 0.2189*** -0.0927** -0.0950** -0.0081 -0.0192*** 0.0079
(0.0415) (0.0437) (0.0480) (0.0582) (0.0051) (0.0494)
Observations 680 680 680 259 257 259
F of excluded instruments 67.06 9.49 14.58 9.36
Notes: Models (1) and (4) are estimated by OLS. Models (2), (3), (5), and (6) are estimated by 2SLS. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the region level are in parentheses. All regressions include year and region fixed effects, as well as regional time
trends. Price discrimination  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station reports any sort of price discrimination when
selling a 20‐second spot in prime time. No. stations is the numbers of TV stations located in a station's coverage area, and is 
instrumented with PP+CC share of votes , the share of votes of the PP and the CC at the regional level in the previous national 
election. Private?  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the station is privately owned. Belongs to network?  is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the station belongs to a (horizontal) local TV station network.  Over 2? is dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if the city where the station is located had more than two stations in 1995. Post law? is a dummy that takes value 
1 for 1998 and 2001 observations. The interaction Over 2? * Post law?  is instrumented with the interaction PP+CC 1993 share *
Post law? , where PP+CC 1993 share  is the share ofvotes of the PP and the CC at the regional level in the June 1993 national 
election. A station is considered an entrant in a given year when it has been on air less than 3 years (the time between
observations). Else, it is considered an incumbent.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Incumbents Entrants
